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A Local Energy Market for Electricity and
Hydrogen
Yunpeng Xiao, Student Member, IEEE, Xifan Wang, Fellow, IEEE, Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Xiuli Wang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The proliferation of distributed energy resources en-
tails efficient market mechanisms in distribution-level networks.
This paper establishes a local energy market (LEM) framework
in which electricity and hydrogen are traded. Players in the
LEM consist of renewable distributed generators (DGs), loads,
hydrogen vehicles (HVs), and a hydrogen storage system (HSS)
operated by a HSS agent (HSSA). An iterative LEM clearing
method is proposed based on the merit order principle. Players
submit offers/bids with consideration of their own preferences
and profiles according to the utility functions. The decentralized
LEM clearing process not only avoids complex calculation in-
duced by centralized decision process, but also preserves players’
privacy. Case studies are conducted that demonstrate that the
LEM promotes local integration of renewable energy, reduces
peak demand, and improves players’ utilities. Sensitivity analysis
is then implemented to discuss the influences on the LEM clearing
results of capacities of DGs, Loads, and the HSS, as well as price
of hydrogen from the hydrogen station (HS).
Index Terms—Distributed energy resources, hydrogen storage
system, iterative market clearing, local energy market.
NOMENCLATURE
Indices
i,j,k Index of renewable DGs/Loads/HVs.
t, l Index of time slots.
mj Index of non-interruptible and deferrable tasks of
Loads.
nj Index of interruptible and deferrable tasks of Loads.
s Index of scenarios.
r Index of iteration.
Parameters
DHV Travel distance of HV. (km)
ELoadid Overall electricity consumed by interruptible
and deferrable tasks of Load (kWh).
MolH Molar mass of hydrogen. (kg·mol−1)
PAEL,max Maximum consumed electricity by electrolyz-
er in an HSSA (kWh).
PAEL,min Minimum consumed electricity by electrolyzer
in an HSSA (kWh).
PAFC,max Maximum generated electricity by fuel cell of
HSSA (kWh).
PAFC,min Minimum generated electricity by fuel cell of
HSSA (kWh).
PDG Electricity generated by DG (kWh).
PLoadid,max Maximum value of electricity consumed by inter-
ruptible and deferrable tasks of Load (kWh).
R Gas constant. (J ·mol−1·K−1)
TA,TH Mean temperature inside hydrogen tank of
HSSA/HV (K)
V cap,V capA Capacity of hydrogen tank of HV/HSSA. (m3)
λDP ,λDS Purchasing/selling price of DisCo (¤/kWh).
λHS Hydrogen price from hydrogen station (¤/kg).
tid1,tid2 Starting/ending time of interruptible and de-
ferrable tasks of Load.
tnid1,tnid2 Earliest/latest starting time of non-interruptible
and deferrable tasks of Load.
tHV 1,tHV 2 Departure/arrival time of HV.
ηHV tra Efficiency of hydrogen over distance of HV.
(kg/km)
ηAEL,ηAFC Efficiency of electrolyzer/fuel cell of HSSA.
ρA,ini Initial pressure of hydrogen tank of HSSA (Pa).
ρA,max Maximum pressure of hydrogen tank of HSSA
(Pa).
ρA,min Minimum pressure of hydrogen tank of HSSA
(Pa).
ρHV,ini Initial pressure of hydrogen tank of HV (Pa).
ρHV,max Maximum pressure of hydrogen tank of HV (Pa).
ρHV,min Minimum pressure of hydrogen tank of HV (Pa).
µH Price difference between λHS and λHL (¤/kg).
σs Weight of scenario s.
εDG,εLoad Adjustment of offering/bidding prices for
DG/Load.
4t Time resolution (=1h).
Variables
PADP Electricity purchased from DisCo by HSSA (kWh).
PADS Electricity sold to DisCo by HSSA (kWh).
PALP Electricity purchased in LEM by HSSA (kWh).
PALS Electricity sold in LEM by HSSA (kWh).
PAbid Bidding amount of HSSA (kWh).
PAoffer Offering amount of HSSA (kWh).
PDGD Electricity sold to DisCo by DG (kWh).
PDGL Electricity sold in LEM by DG (kWh).
PDGoffer Offering amount of DG (kWh).
PDGdeal Accepted amount of DG (kWh).
PLoad Electricity consumed by Load (kWh).
PLoadD Electricity purchased from DisCo by Load (kWh).
PLoadL Electricity purchased in LEM by Load (kWh).
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PLoadnind Electricity consumed by non-interruptible
and non-deferrable tasks of Load (kWh).
PLoadid Electricity consumed by interruptible and
deferrable tasks of Load (kWh).
PLoadnid Electricity consumed by non-interruptible
and deferrable tasks of Load (kWh).
PLoadbid Bidding amount of Load (kWh).
PLoaddeal Accepted amount of Load (kWh).
QHAL Hydrogen sold in LEM of HSSA (kg).
QHAS Hydrogen purchased from hydrogen station
of HSSA (kg).
QHV L Hydrogen purchased in LEM of HV (kg).
QHV S Hydrogen purchased from hydrogen station
of HV (kg).
QHV P Total purchased hydrogen of HV (kg).
QHV U Total consumed hydrogen of HV (kg).
QHV bid Bidding amount of hydrogen of HV (kg).
λAbid Bidding price of HSSA (¤/kWh).
λAoffer Offering price of HSSA (¤/kWh).
λLnA Electricity price in LEM without HSSA
(¤/kWh).
λL Electricity price in LEM (¤/kWh).
λHL Hydrogen price in LEM (¤/kg).
λDGoffer Offering price of DG (¤/kWh).
λLoadbid Bidding price of Load (¤/kWh).
λHV bid Bidding price of HV (¤/kg).
ρHV ,ρA Pressure of hydrogen tank of HV/HSSA
(Pa).
uAP ,uAS Binaries indicating operation mode of
HSSA.
unid Binary indicating operation mode of non-
interruptible and deferrable tasks of Load.
CA Cost of HSSA (¤).
CHV Cost of HV (¤).
CLoad Cost of Load (¤).
UDG Utility of DG (¤).
ULM ,ULMA Social welfare of LEM without/with HSSA
(¤).
I. INTRODUCTION
D ISTRIBUTED energy resources (DERs) including DGs,flexible loads and energy storage systems (ESSs) have
been observed to proliferate and eventually take up a remark-
able share in distribution-level networks [1]-[4]. In order to
efficiently adopt DERs and properly evaluate their potential
impacts, importance should be attached to the trading frame-
work of DERs [5].
On the one hand, some studies focus on proposing trading
strategies for DERs under current market mechanisms, which
can be categorized as two groups, according to whether an
energy aggregator (EA) exists. The EA, often served by the
DisCo, can manage a microgrid or a virtual power plant
[2], [6]-[8], and maximize the overall utility. Some of the
EAs may possess DGs or ESSs to hedge against risks [9].
However, this attribute results in problems regarding alloca-
tion of profits/costs among players, as well as computational
difficulties introduced by the increasing number of players.
Moreover, players’ privacy is sacrificed. In the absence of EAs,
consensus-based and ADMM (alternating direction method of
multipliers) -based distributed scheduling methods are pro-
posed [10]-[12]. These methods are dependent on the in-time
information exchanges. Transactive energy is also emerging
for coordinated operation of vast numbers of actively involved
DERs based on value-based information in a smart grid [13].
On the other hand, the increasing penetration of DERs
resulting in large-scale coexistence of generation and con-
sumption in the vicinity of a neighborhood, together with
the enhancement of communication and automatic control
methods in a smart-grid environment, enable the creation of a
LEM to trade DERs within the distribution level, also referred
to as a decentralized or community energy market [1], [14]-
[20]. For example, in the U.S., a green energy market has
been established, only for trading renewable and uncertain
energy: A large number of utilities, combining several kinds
of energy sources and small-scale generating units, are now
participating in this green energy market [1], [19]. In the
Netherlands, a platform to trade customers’ self-generated
power has been implemented, in which the trade happens
in peers under certain contracts [20]. Shamsi et al. [17]
develop an economic dispatch problem considering mutual
trade among agents within a local energy market in the
structure of a community microgrid installed in the Missouri.
Parag et al. [14] thoroughly discuss potential local trading
manners for prosumers, such as decentralized, autonomous
and flexible peer-to-peer models and prosumer community
groups. Sikdar et al. [16] merge electric vehicles and electricity
sources in a decentralized market based on random matching
and subsequent bargaining. However, a complete local energy
market can include many sources of uncertainty and flexibility,
such as renewable DGs, flexible demands, and storage. Few
studies ever concentrate on this situation, in which multiple
sorts of independent participants exist. Furthermore, since the
marginal production cost of renewable DGs is often deemed
as zero, pricing of the zero-marginal-production-cost market
is an indispensable issue when designing a LEM, and neither
has this been discussed by current literature.
Since the ESS shows indispensable potentials in mitigating
fluctuating generation, much more attention has been paid to
trading strategies of ESS, which can be categorized in three
groups. First, the ESS is combined with uncertain generations
to reduce the revenue loss caused by forecast errors and to
arbitrage in dynamic prices [22]. Second, the ESS is owned
by a third party and the capacity is shared by players [23].
Third, the ESS participates in the electricity as an independent
stakeholder to maximize its own utility [24]-[25]. As for
the trading strategy of independent ESSs, most studies only
consider the trade towards wholesale market. However, a
distribution-level ESS can also trade directly to consumers for
more profitability as other DERs. Few works focus on this
two-sided trading.
Among the wide variety of types of ESS, the HSS has
become a promising approach, since the whole electricity-
hydrogen conversion process is carbon free and only uti-
lizes water. The HSS consists of an electrolyzer, a hydrogen
storage tank and a fuel cell. Hydrogen is produced from
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electrolysis and stored in the hydrogen storage tank, and
the fuel cell is used to generate electricity by hydrogen.
Hydrogen can be purchased from a hydrogen station (HS)
and sold to hydrogen consumers, eg. HVs [26]-[27]. The
detailed operation principles of HSS are beyond the scope
of this paper. The coordination of electricity and hydrogen
has attracted increasing attention in current studies. The HSS
can be utilized to improve revenues of wind generation [28]
and for electricity retailers [29]. You et al. [30] further assess
the value of an independent HSS in a multi-energy system
containing electricity, heat, and gas.
The contributions of this work include the following. First,
a LEM framework is established, in which both electricity and
hydrogen are traded. Players of the LEM include renewable
DGs, flexible and non-flexible loads, electric vehicles (EVs),
HVs and an HSS. Since the LEM is organized at distribution
level, players can choose to participate in the LEM or trade
with DisCo/HS. To compare the advantages/disadvantages of
trading in the LEM and with DisCo/Hs and to address the
influence of the HSS in the LEM, three cases are discussed
in Section V. Then an iterative LEM clearing method is
proposed based on the merit order principle. The whole LEM
clearing procedure only requires players’ offering or bidding
parameters (prices and amounts) instead of their preferences
and profiles (detailed utilization parameters of each appliance),
thus preserving their privacy. As for the ESS, an HSS is
adopted and operated by the HSSA. The proposed models and
methods can be similarly applied where the ESS is in other
forms.
For the sake of clarity, the following assumptions are made.
1. All players participating in the LEM are rational and have
self-interest in their own objectives.
2. Network constraints are not taken into account, assuming
all the players are connected to one feeder.
3. Strategic behaviors of the players are not taken into
account, since players have no information or prior about the
others’ parameters during the iterative process.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II
describes the system and problems in detail. Then Section
III formulates mathematical models for LEM players. The
iterative LEM clearing method is proposed in Section IV. Test
cases and results analysis are conducted in Section V, and
Section VI follows to conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This paper considers a LEM with 4 sorts of players,
including renewable DGs, Loads (flexible, non-flexible, EVs),
an HSSA, and HVs. Fig. 1 demonstrates an overall view of the
LEM. The rectangle in dotted line represents the distribution
network. Directions of power and hydrogen flows are demon-
strated. Renewable DGs with zero marginal production costs
sell electricity to the DisCo or the LEM. Loads are households
in this paper, including flexible tasks, non-flexible tasks and
EVs. Each household decides on portfolios in purchasing
electricity from the DisCo and LEM based on its own utility
function. The HSSA can either purchase or sell electricity with
both the DisCo and the LEM. Furthermore, it can purchase
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Fig. 2. Iterative LEM clearing method.
hydrogen from the HS and sell hydrogen to the LEM. HVs
purchase hydrogen either from the HS or in the LEM. Note
that the HS is assumed to acquire hydrogen directly from
hydrogen-producing companies, instead of by electrolyzing
water. Otherwise, the HS can be considered as the HSSA.
The LEM operator is in charge of gathering offering/bidding
parameters (prices and amounts) from different players aiming
at maximizing social surplus. The LEM operator also broad-
casts clearing results. The DisCo sells electricity to Loads
and purchases electricity from renewable DGs and the HSSA,
while the HS provides hydrogen to HVs and the HSSA.
Note that prices of selling and purchasing electricity with
the DisCo are settled based on wholesale day-ahead prices,
thus the LEM is actually a day-ahead market. The energy de-
viations from the scheduled quantities in the LEM are balanced
with the DisCo at the selling/purchasing price (λDS /λDP ).
Since the LEM is set at distribution level, the number of
players can be large and players differ in utility/cost features.
To preserve privacy, players broadcast their offers/bids in the
LEM instead of preferences and profiles (detailed utilization
parameters of each appliance), and compete on both price
and amount. Therefore, the competition among the players
in this setting is neither Bertrand (competition on price) nor
Nash-Cournot (competition on amount), but rather a mixture
of both. Therefore, different from the problems where the
players determine only the optimal amount or the optimal price
for a particular amount, which can be solved by forming a
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints [31]-[32],
an intermediary step is anticipated to determine the offers/bids
for players before the market-clearing process. Furthermore,
with the help of smart-grid technologies, the LEM can be
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cleared in an iterative manner and no central entity is needed,
indicating the players’ privacy is preserved. Each player can
make in-time decisions on its own offering/bidding strategies,
and the market-clearing process is transparent with results
broadcast promptly [8] [33]. On the one hand, thanks to
advanced metering infrastructure and communication proto-
cols, information regarding market prices and offering/bidding
parameters is exchanged in the LEM promptly. On the other
hand, each player is equipped with unit management mod-
ules [8] embedded in their appliances, which are responsible
for autonomously controlling the player’s behavior based on
market clearing results as well as generating and submitting
offering/bidding parameters to the market operator. As shown
in Fig. 2, in the market-clearing process, each player submits
its offering/bidding parameters to the market operator, who
clears the LEM based on the merit order principle to maximize
social welfare, and then broadcasts the results to all players.
Each player then adapts its offering/bidding parameters based
on the cleared results aiming at maximizing its own utility.
The offering/bidding parameters will be sent back to the
LEM operator and the LEM will be cleared again, until no
adjustment on players’ behavior is observed.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR PLAYERS
This section illustrates mathematical models for players to
maximize their utilities. The players can use these to generate
their offering/bidding parameters, according to Fig. 2.
A. Renewable Distributed Generator
For renewable DG i, the objective function is
max
ΓDGi
UDGi =
∑
s
σs
∑
t
(λDPt P
DGD
i,t,s + λ
L
t P
DGL
i,t,s ) (1)
s.t. PDGDi,t,s + P
DGL
i,t,s = P
DG
i,t,s (2)
where ΓDGi =
{
PDGDi,t,s , P
DGL
i,t,s ;∀i, t, s
}
is the variable set.
The objective of a renewable DG is to achieve the maximum
value of overall profit in selling electricity to the DisCo and
in the LEM, as represented in (1). The sum of electricity sold
to the DisCo and in the LEM equals total generation, as (2).
B. Load
Load j consists of three sorts of tasks, including inter-
ruptible and deferrable tasks, non-interruptible and deferrable
tasks, as well as non-interruptible and non-deferrable tasks.
The objective function of Load j is
min
ΓLoadj
CLoadj =
∑
s
σs
∑
t
(λDSt P
LoadD
j,t,s + λ
L
t P
LoadL
j,t,s ) (3)
s.t.
PLoadDj,t,s + P
LoadL
j,t,s = P
Load
j,t,s (4)
PLoadj,t,s = P
Loadnind
j,t,s +
∑
nj
PLoadidj,nj ,t,s +
∑
mj
PLoadnidj,mj ,t,s (5)∑
t
PLoadidj,nj ,t,s = E
Loadid
j,nj ,s (6)
PLoadidj,nj ,t,s = 0, when t /∈ (tid1j,nj ,s, tid2j,nj ,s) (7)
0 ≤ PLoadidj,nj ,t,s ≤ PLoadid,maxj,nj ,s (8)
unidj,mj ,t,s ∈ {0, 1} (9)
unidj,mj ,t,s = 0, when t /∈ (tnid1j,mj ,s, tnid2j,mj ,s) (10)∑
t
unidj,mj ,t,s = 1 (11)
PLoadnidj,mj ,t,s =
∑
l
PLoadnidj,mj ,l,s u
nid
j,mj ,t,s (12)
where ΓLoadj =
{
PLoadDj,t,s , P
LoadL
j,t,s ;∀j, t, s
}
is the variable
set. PLoadnidj,mj ,l,s represents the predefined profiles of the task.
The objective of a Load is to achieve the minimum value of
overall cost in purchasing electricity from the DisCo and in the
LEM, as represented in (3). The sum of electricity purchased
from the DisCo and in the LEM equals the total consumption,
and also equals the sum of electricity consumed by the three
sorts of tasks, as shown in (4) and (5). Constraints (6)-(8) are
for interruptible and deferrable tasks. The overall electricity
consumption is constrained in (6). Equation (7) represents
the starting and ending time, and the maximum electricity
consumption of task nj is limited as (8) limits. Constraints (9)-
(12) are for non-interruptible and deferrable tasks. Equations
(9)-(11) constrain the binary representing the starting time of
task mj . The optimized profile of task mj is determined by
the predefined profile, as captured (12).
C. Hydrogen Vehicle
For the HV k, the objective function is
min
ΓHVk
CHVk =
∑
s
σs
∑
t
(λHSt Q
HV S
k,t,s + λ
HL
t Q
HV L
k,t,s ) (13)
s.t.
QHV Pk,t,s = Q
HV S
k,t,s +Q
HV L
k,t,s (14)
QHV Pk,t,s = 0, when t ∈ (tHV 1k,s , tHV 2k,s ) (15)
QHV Uk,t,s = 0, when t /∈ (tHV 1k,s , tHV 2k,s ) (16)
DHVk,t,sη
HV tra
k = Q
HV U
k,t,s (17)
ρHVk,t,s = ρ
HV
k,t−1,s +
RTHk
V capk Mol
H
(QHV Pk,t,s −QHV Uk,t,s ) (18)
ρHV,mink ≤ ρHVk,t,s ≤ ρHV,maxk (19)
ρHVk,t0,s = ρ
HV
k,tT−1,s = ρ
HV,ini
k (20)
where ΓHVk =
{
QHV Sk,t,s , Q
HV L
k,t,s ;∀k, t, s
}
is the variable set.
The objective of an HV is to achieve the minimum value
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of overall cost in purchasing hydrogen from the HS and
in the LEM, as represented in (13). The total purchased
hydrogen equals the sum of that purchased from the HS and
in the LEM, as shown in (14). The purchasing and utilization
time of hydrogen of the HV are presented in (15) and (16).
Equation (17) stands for the need for hydrogen to operate the
HV. Constraints (18)-(20) are for the hydrogen tank of the
HV, where the hydrogen pressure is calculated by (18), the
boundary of hydrogen pressure is ensured by (19), and the
initial value is forced by (20).
D. Hydrogen Storage System Agent
For the HSSA, the objective function is
min
ΓA
CA =
∑
t
(λDSt P
ADP
t − λDPt PADSt + λLt PALPt
− λLt PALSt + λHSt QHASt − λHLt QHALt ) (21)
s.t.
QHALt =
∑
k
QHV Lk,t (22)
ρAt = ρ
A
t−1 +
RTA
V capAMolH
(
ηAEL(PADPt + P
ALP
t )
LHV H
∆tMolH
− P
ADS
t + P
ALS
t
ηAFCLHV H
∆tMolH +QHASt −QHALt ) (23)
ρA,min ≤ ρAt ≤ ρA,max (24)
ρAt0 = ρ
A
tT−1 = ρ
A,ini (25)
PADPt + P
ALP
t ≤ uAPt PAEL,max (26)
PADPt + P
ALP
t ≥ uAPt PAEL,min (27)
PADSt + P
ALS
t ≤ uASt PAFC,max (28)
PADSt + P
ALS
t ≥ uASt PAFC,min (29)
uAPt , u
AS
t ∈ {0, 1} , uAPt + uASt ≤ 1 (30)
λHLt = λ
HS
t − µH (31)
where ΓA =
{
PADPt , P
ADS
t , P
ALP
t , P
ALS
t , Q
HAS
t , Q
HAL
t ;∀t
}
is the variable set. The objective of the HSSA is to achieve
the minimum value of overall cost in trading electricity and
hydrogen with the DisCo, HS and LEM, as represented
in (21). The amount of hydrogen traded in the LEM
is constrained in (22). Constraints (23)-(25) are for the
hydrogen tank of the HSSA, where the hydrogen pressure is
calculated by (23), the boundary of the hydrogen pressure
is ensured by (24), and the initial value is forced by (25).
Constraints (26)-(30) provide the limits for hydrogen and
electricity production by the HSSA. Note that hydrogen
production and electricity production cannot be carried out
at the same time. Equation (31) shows the relation between
hydrogen price from the HS and in the LEM. According to
(13)-(20), it is clear to see that when µH > 0 in (31), HVs
will purchase hydrogen from the HSSA up to the maximum
the HSSA can provide.
IV. THE ITERATIVE LOCAL ENERGY MARKET CLEARING
METHOD
A. The Local Energy Market Clearing Principle
As stated in Section II, the LEM clearing method is in
an iterative manner. The players adjust their offering/bidding
parameters after the LEM is cleared, and then the LEM is
cleared again with adjusted parameters and broadcasts the re-
sults to players until no adjustment of players’ offering/bidding
parameters is observed. In each iteration process, the LEM
clearing method should result in maximizing social welfare
and it should respect the merit order principle. However, if
the supply and demand curves fail to intersect, the LEM
price will be settled as the price of the last unit of accepted
amount on the curve that has a surplus [34]. Since the players
are able to decide whether to participate in the LEM, their
offering/bidding parameters should assure that they achieve
higher utilities in the LEM than in trading with the DisCo/HS.
B. Offering/Bidding Parameters
Since players want to achieve higher utilities through every
iteration, they determine their offering/bidding parameters
based on the utility values in the last iteration. Specifically,
the offering/bidding parameters are generated according to the
utility/cost of trading with the DisCo in the first iteration.
For DG i, if the accepted amount of electricity in the LEM is
P
DGdeal,(r−1)
i,t at the price of λ
L,(r−1)
t in the r−1 th iteration,
then the offering parameters in the t th iteration are
λ
DGoffer,(r)
i,t =
{
λDPt , if P
DGoffer,(r)
i,t ∈ SDG1,(r)i,t
λ
L,(r−1)
t , if P
DGoffer,(r)
i,t ∈ SDG2,(r)i,t
(32)
where SDG1,(r)i,t =
[
0, 1
Ns
∑
s
PDGi,t,s − PDGdeal,(r−1)i,t
]
,SDG2,(r)i,t =[
1
Ns
∑
s
PDGi,t,s − PDGdeal,(r−1)i,t , 1Ns
∑
s
PDGi,t,s
]
. Note that λL,(r−1)t >
λDPt , otherwise the DG would not participate in the r − 1 th
iteration of LEM.
Similarly, for Load j, the bidding parameters are
λ
Loadbid,(r)
j,t =
{
λDSt , if P
Loadbid,(r)
j,t ∈ SLoad1,(r)j,t
λ
L,(r−1)
t , if P
Loadbid,(r)
j,t ∈ SLoad2,(r)j,t
(33)
where SLoad1,(r)j,t =
[
0, 1
Ns
∑
s
P
Load,(r)
j,t,s − PLoaddeal,(r−1)j,t
]
,
S
Load2,(r)
j,t =
[
1
Ns
∑
s
P
Load,(r)
j,t,s − PLoaddeal,(r−1)j,t , 1Ns
∑
s
P
Load,(r)
j,t,s
]
.
Also note that λL,(r−1)t < λDSt , otherwise the Load would not
participate in the r − 1 th iteration of LEM.
For HV k, the bidding parameters are
λ
HV bid,(r)
k,t =
{
λHSt , if Q
HV bid,(r)
k,t ∈ SHV 1,(r)k,t
λ
HL,(r−1)
t , if Q
HV bid,(r)
k,t ∈ SHV 2,(r)k,t
(34)
where SHV 1,(r)k,t =
[
0, 1
Ns
∑
s
Q
HV P,(r)
k,t,s −QHV L,(r−1)k,t
]
,
S
HV 2,(r)
k,t =
[
1
Ns
∑
s
Q
HV P,(r)
k,t,s −QHV L,(r−1)k,t , 1Ns
∑
s
Q
HV P,(r)
k,t,s
]
.
According to the iterative clearing method, which will be
described in subsection IV-C, the HSSA only participates in
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the LEM after the LEM is cleared in the absence of the HSSA
with λLnA,(r)t generated. Therefore, the offering/bidding pa-
rameters of the HSSA are
λ
Aoffer,(r)
t = λ
LnA,(r)
t , if P
Aoffer,(r)
t ∈
[
0, P
ALS,(r)
t
]
(35)
λ
Abid,(r)
t = λ
LnA,(r)
t , if P
Abid,(r)
t ∈
[
0, P
ALP,(r)
t
]
(36)
C. The Iterative Clearing Procedure
The HVs are the only consumers of hydrogen in the LEM,
and their trading strategies are quite easy to capture. According
to (13)-(20) and (34), the HVs will purchase hydrogen from
the LEM as much as they need or the LEM can supply, as
long as the hydrogen price in the LEM is lower than that
from the HS (µH > 0 in (31)). Since the HSSA is the unique
hydrogen producer in the LEM, it is capable of settling the
traded amount of hydrogen in the LEM by controlling the
hydrogen price in the LEM according to (31). It is quite simple
to observe that the HSSA would like to set µH in (31) to a
positive value close to zero. As a consequence, more attention
is paid to electricity trading in the LEM here.
Fig. 3 depicts the iterative LEM clearing procedure and it
consists of four steps, as follows.
Step 1. Assume the amounts of electricity accepted by all
DGs and Loads are zero, the offering/bidding parameters of
each DG and Load are acquired based on the optimization of
utility functions. The LEM is firstly cleared in the absence of
the HSSA after receiving all offering/bidding parameters from
DGs and Loads, because the HSSA will use the cleared LEM
price without HSSA to generate offering/bidding parameters,
according to (35) and (36). The mathematical models of LEM
clearing in the absence of the HSSA are as follows, and the
objective is to achieve the maximum value of social welfare,
represented as
max
ΓLM,(r)
ULM,(r) =
∑
j
λ
Loadbid,(r)
j,t P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t
−
∑
i
λ
DGoffer,(r)
i,t P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t (37)
s.t.
∑
i
P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t =
∑
j
P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t (38)
0 < P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t ≤ PDGoffer,(r)i,t (39)
0 < P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t ≤ PLoadbid,(r)j,t (40)
where ΓLM,(r) =
{
P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t , P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t ;∀i, j, t
}
is the
variable set. Constraints (38)-(40) ensure that the accepted
amount of electricity is in feasible regions.
Step 2. The HSSA receives cleared prices λLnA,(r)t , op-
timizes strategies based on utility functions, and generates
offering/bidding parameters. Then the LEM is cleared in the
presence of the HSSA after receiving all offering/bidding pa-
rameters from DGs, Loads, and the HSSA. The mathematical
models of LEM clearing in the presence of the HSSA are as
follows, and the objective is to achieve the maximum value of
social welfare, represented as
max
ΓLMA,(r)
ULMA,(r) =
∑
j
λ
Loadbid,(r)
j,t P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t
+ λ
LnA,(r)
t P
Abiddeal,(r)
t −
∑
i
λ
DGoffer,(r)
i,t P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t
− λLnA,(r)t PAofferdeal,(r)t (41)
s.t.
∑
i
P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t + P
Aofferdeal,(r)
t
=
∑
j
P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t + P
Abiddeal,(r)
t (42)
0 < P
Aofferdeal,(r)
t ≤ PAoffer,(r)t (43)
0 < P
Abiddeal,(r)
t ≤ PAbid,(r)t (44)
(39)-(40).
where ΓLMA,(r) =
{
P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t , P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t , P
Abiddeal,(r)
t ,
P
Aofferdeal,(r)
t ;∀i, j, t
}
is the variable set. PAofferdeal,(r)t
and PAofferdeal,(r)t are the accepted offered and bid amount
of electricity for the HSSA. Constraints (39)-(40) and
(42)-(44) ensure that the accepted amount of electricity is
in feasible regions. With the results of LEM clearing in the
presence of the HSSA, the DGs, Loads, HVs, and HSSA can
calculate their optimized trading strategies and utilities.
Step 3. The iteration takes place for rolling time slots
through the time span, considering the situation that trading
strategies can be coupled during different time slots. Two
conditions affect the termination of the iterative LEM clearing
process. First, all the DGs and Loads should justify the
performance of adjustment in r − 1 th iteration, as shown in
Block A. If the adjustment brings no increase in utility to the
DGs or Loads, the adjustment in the r th iteration is to revise
the adjustment in the r− 1 th iteration, as shown in Block B.
Second, if the adjustment in the r− 1 th iteration is accepted
by the DGs and Loads, they still have to decide whether to
adjust the offering/bidding prices in the r th iteration, as shown
in Block C. If a DG finds out that the consumers’ bidding
amount is not entirely accepted (represented as (45)-(46)),
which implies room for elevating prices, the DG will elevate
the offering price in order to achieve higher utility. Similarly,
if a Load finds out that the suppliers’ offering amount is not
entirely accepted (represented as (47)-(48)), which implies
room for reducing prices, the Load will reduce the bidding
price in order to achieve higher utility, as shown in Block E.
Otherwise, no adjustment will be made, as shown in Block D.
P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t = P
DGoffer,(r)
i,t > 0 (45)∑
j
P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t + P
Abiddeal,(r)
t
<
∑
j
P
Loadbid,(r)
j,t + P
Abid,(r)
t (46)
P
Loaddeal,(r)
j,t = P
Loadbid,(r)
j,t > 0 (47)∑
i
P
DGdeal,(r)
i,t + P
Aofferdeal,(r)
t
<
∑
i
P
DGoffer,(r)
i,t + P
Aoffer,(r)
t (48)
Step 4. If there still needs some adjustment, go back to
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Fig. 3. The iterative LEM clearing procedure.
Step 1. Otherwise, the iteration terminates, and the LEM will
be finally cleared in the presence of the HSSA with the results
broadcast. Note that similar to the conventional market, when
the LEM is cleared, the results will be sent to system operator
for security/voltage check.
D. Issues of Convergence
As the unique producer of hydrogen in the LEM, the HSSA
is able to determine how much hydrogen is traded in the
LEM by adjusting the offering price of hydrogen, provided
the offering amount does not exceed the amount HVs need.
In contrast, the electricity prices are formed through an
iteration process to balance supply and demand. As stated in
the Step. 3 of the algorithm, the sequences of proposed bids
for each consumer j generated by the algorithm are increasing,
while the sequences of proposed offers for each producer i are
decreasing. To be specific, in a time slot when the supplier
finds out its offering amount is completely accepted, whereas
there is still some bidding amount of the consumers left, the
supplier will elevate its offering price intending to achieve
higher utility. In this case, the price will rise consequently, and
then the HSSA may increase its offering amount or reduce
its bidding amount. As a result, the total supply increases
or the total demand decreases, until the supplier no longer
observes the complete acceptance of its offering amount or
an increase in its utility. It is similar for the case when the
consumer observes its bidding amount is completely accepted,
whereas there is still some offering amount of the suppliers
left. Moreover, as stated in Section IV-A, in the case where the
supply and demand curves fail to intersect, the LEM price will
be settled as the price of the last unit of accepted amount of
the curve that has a surplus. Therefore, the price varies during
the iteration process to balance the supply and demand, and
will necessarily converge. On the other hand, players have the
right to choose to trade with the DisCo or in the LEM, thus
prices in the LEM will not exceed those of DisCo, i.e. in the
range of λDPt and λ
DS
t . This attribute introduces caps for the
LEM prices.
The iterative LEM clearing procedure is a multiplayer game
in which all players only care about maximizing their own
utilities. In each iteration, the LEM operator clears the market
to maximize the social welfare. Furthermore, players have to
ensure that the adjustments introduce no decrease in their
utilities. These attributes are proved as when the converged
solution is achieved, no player has a unilateral incentive to
deviate.
V. CASE STUDY
A. Data and Approach
In this section, the feasibility and effectiveness of the
proposed iterative LEM clearing method are numerically ana-
lyzed in a 24-hr. period within a distribution network. The
distribution network consists of renewable DGs with total
capacity of 500kW, 100 households with 90 EVs and 90 HVs,
and an HSSA.
Data regarding renewable DG generation are acquired from
[2]. Note that there is no power generation before time slot 3
or after time slot 19. Data of three sorts of tasks of Loads
are obtained from [35]-[36], with an assumption that the
starting/ending time requirements of different tasks are in
Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of 1-3 hrs. For
the detailed data of Loads, see Appendix. Driving patterns for
EVs and HVs are randomly generated based on statistical data
from the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) data set in
the U.S. [37]. All HVs are assumed to be Hyundai ix35 FUEL
CELL vehicles, detailed parameters of which are illustrated in
[38]. The HSSA is assumed to have 20 HSSs, the parameters
of which are illustrated in [29]. To consider the uncertainties
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Fig. 8. Electricity and hydrogen production/consumption of the HSSA.
of renewable DG generation, demand of Loads and HVs, we
generate 1000 scenarios and reduce them to 5 [39]. Prices for
the DisCo are acquired from [9]. Hydrogen price from the HS
is set to 1.35 ¤/kg. The adjustment of offering/bidding prices
for DGs (εDGi,t ) and Loads (ε
Load
j,t ) are all set to 0.001 ¤/kWh.
To clearly illustrate the applicability and efficiency of the
proposed LEM, three cases are compared.
Case 1: Adopt LEM and HSSA exists in the LEM.
Case 2: Not adopt LEM and players only trade with
DisCo/Hs.
Case 3: Adopt LEM but no HSSA exists in the LEM.
Note that to apply the mathematical models in Section III
to Case 2, just set the quantity offered/bid in the LEM by each
player as 0.
B. Local Energy Market Clearing
The market prices for Case 1 are shown in Fig. 4. The
LEM prices stay in the range of the purchasing and selling
electricity prices of the DisCo. For time plots when the LEM
price equals the purchasing price of the DisCo, bids in the
LEM are completely accepted, whereas offers are not. For
time plots when the LEM price equals the selling price of the
DisCo, offers in the LEM are completely accepted, whereas
bids are not. For time plots when the LEM price lies between
the purchasing and selling prices of the DisCo, neither offers
nor bids are completely accepted.
Case 1 is further compared to the other two cases. Fig. 5
compares the DG generation of Cases 1 and 3. It is observed
that the LEM in Case 1 adopts 33.39% more DG generation
than in Case 3. Therefore, the LEM combining the HSS
promotes the local integration of renewable energy. Fig. 6
further demonstrates the load consumption of the three cases.
About 20.14% more demands are met in the LEM in Case 1
than in Case 3. Furthermore, the peak demand is 7.21% and
8.60% lower in Cases 1 and 3 than in Case 2, respectively.
Therefore, the LEM helps to reduce the peak value of demand.
Fig. 7 compares the overall utility in Cases 1 and 3. The
DGs and Loads are considered as two sorts of utility-seeking
players and they attempt to agree on a settlement point, which
is the market clearing point. According to Nash bargaining
theory, the settlement point is where the product of increases
in utilities of the DGs and Loads reaches the maximum value,
represented as [40]
U = (
∑
i
U
DG,[withLEM ]
i −
∑
i
U
DG,[withoutLEM ]
i )
· (
∑
j
C
Load,[withoutLEM ]
j −
∑
j
C
Load,[withLEM ]
j ) (49)
As shown in Fig. 7, the value of overall utility U varies
during the iteration process and converges to the maximum
value. In case 1, with the help of the HSSA, the overall utility
is improved by 77.96%. The LEM is thus proved to be able
to improve the players’ utilities.
The strategies of the HSSA are demonstrated in Fig. 8.
The HSSA never sells electricity to the DisCo because the
electricity purchasing prices of the DisCo are always no higher
than those in the LEM. The HSSA never purchases hydrogen
from the HS because the cost of purchasing hydrogen from the
HS is higher than that of producing hydrogen with electricity,
which is acquired when electricity prices are relatively low.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate the influences of different DG and Load capaci-
ties on the LEM clearing, the capacities of the DGs and Loads
are set to 0.50, 0.75, 1.25, 1.50 and 1.75 times those in Case
1, respectively. The results are shown in Figs. 9 and 10. The
percentage of DG absorption refers to the ratio of accepted DG
amount in the LEM to the total DG generation. The equivalent
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Fig. 10. DG/Loads utility vs. DG and
Load capacities.
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Fig. 11. DG absorption, peak demand, DGs’/Loads’
utility vs. HSSA capacity.
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sold in LEM vs. HSSA capacity.
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Fig. 13. DG absorption, peak demand, DGs’/
Load utility vs. Hydrogen price from HS.
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Fig. 14. Amount of traded electricity and
hydrogen vs. Hydrogen price from HS.
peak demand refers to the peak demand when Load capacity
is converted to the value in Case 1 so as to remove the effects
of differences in Load capacity. As shown in Figs. 9 and 10,
the increase in a DG’s capacity leads to a decrease in DG
absorption, peak demand, the DGs’ utility and the Loads’ cost,
whereas the increase in a Load’s capacity results in an increase
in DG absorption, peak demand, DGs’ utility and Loads’ cost.
This is because the increase in a DG’s capacity results in lower
LEM prices, whereas the increase in a Load’s capacity results
in higher LEM prices. This demonstrates that both DGs and
Loads are not willing to enlarge their trading capacities in the
LEM with consideration of their utilities. The LEM operator
should balance the increase in capacities of both producers
and consumers to make the LEM economically attractive so
as to enhance the market size. For example, to ensure a
certain level of DG absorption, the timing of introducing DG
capacity is extremely critical in order to reach the optimal
inter-temporal social welfare. To be specific, expansion of
the DG’s capacity should happen in response to an increase
in demand. Otherwise, the DGs would choose to trade with
the DisCo and thus the decentralized nature of the system is
weakened.
The HSSA’s capacity is also adjusted to evaluate its impact
on DG absorption, peak demand, DGs’ utility and Loads’ cost,
as shown in Fig. 11. The peak demand here is calculated as
the ratio of equivalent peak demand to the maximum value
of equivalent peak demand. The DG absorption and peak
demand reach the highest value when HSSA capacity is 1.50
and 2.00 times that in Case 1, respectively. The DGs’ utility
increases and the Loads’ cost decreases slightly along with
increasing HSSA capacity. Fig. 12 further demonstrates the
HSSA’s utility and the amount of hydrogen sold in LEM. With
the increasing HSSA capacity, the HSSA’s utility reaches the
maximum value when the HSSA capacity is 2.00 times that
in Case 1, while the amount of hydrogen sold in the LEM
gradually increases. This demonstrates that the HSSA can set
its capacity at the optimal value to achieve the highest utility.
The hydrogen price from the HS is a key factor for gen-
erating offering/bidding parameters of the HSSA and HVs.
As shown in Fig. 13, the increasing hydrogen price results
in increasing DG absorption, DGs’ utility and Loads’ cost,
whereas peak demand increases at first and remains steady
afterwards. This is because the HSSA will purchase more
electricity from the LEM and less hydrogen from the HS with
the increasing hydrogen price, as shown in Fig. 14.
D. Computational Issues
With regard to computational issues, all problems are im-
plemented on C++ and the related MILP problems are solved
by CPLEX, on a computer with an Intel Core i7 3.60GHz
CPU and 8GB of RAM. The averaged iteration time of the
problems is 2273, and the averaged running time is 825s.
VI. CONCLUSION
To provide an efficient market mechanism for integrating
DERs in a distribution-level network, this paper establishes
an LEM framework in which electricity and hydrogen are
traded. Players including renewable DGs, Loads, HVs, and an
HSS participate in the LEM by submitting offers/bids based
on their own preferences and profiles according to the utility
functions. An iterative LEM clearing method is proposed
based on the merit order principle, and it not only avoids
complex calculation induced by a centralized decision process
but also preserves players’ privacy. Case studies are conducted
to justify the applicability and efficiency of the LEM. The
results show that the LEM promotes the local integration of
renewable energy by 33.39%, reduces peak demand by 7.21%,
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and improves players’ utilities by 77.96%. Sensitivity analysis
is also implemented to analyze the influences on LEM clearing
results of the capacities of DGs, Loads, and the HSSA, as well
as price of hydrogen from the HS.
APPENDIX
The data regarding three sorts of tasks of Loads are illus-
trated in Tables I, II and III.
TABLE I: Data on non-interruptible and non-deferrable tasks
Task Power (kW) Total usage period (h)
Refregerator 1.666 24
Telephone 0.005 24
Others 0.05 24
TABLE II: Data on interruptible and deferrable tasks
Task Power
(kW)
Total
usage
period
(h)
Averaged
tid1j,nj
Averaged
tid2j,nj
Standard
deviation of
tid1j,nj /t
id2
j,nj
(h)
AC 1.2 7.25 16:45 08:30 3
Oven 1.2 0.5 19:00 20:45 1
Microwave 0.2 0.25 18:45 20:00 1.5
Iron 1.2 0.5 19:00 19:45 1
Toaster 0.2 0.25 07:15 08:30 2
Kettle 1 0.5 06:45 07:45 2.5
Dishwasher 1.32 0.5 20:00 22:45 3
Hairdryer 0.9 0.25 20:30 21:30 2.5
Others 0.12 0.5 17:00 9:45 3
TABLE III: Data on non-interruptible and deferrable tasks
Task Power
(kW)
Total
usage
period
(h)
Averaged
tnid1j,nj
Averaged
tnid2j,nj
Standard
deviation
of tnid1j,nj
(h)
TV 0.083 6.75 16:00 23:30 3
Washing
machine
1.4 1 17:45 21:30 1.5
Computer 0.15 2.25 19:30 23:00 2
Others 0.09 3 15:30 09:30 3
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